President Clinton on Iraq's agreement to resume weapons inspections: transcript

Key points

• Clinton said Iraq had agreed to unconditional compliance with UN weapons inspectors and had rescinded its August and October decisions to end cooperation.
• He listed five obligations: resolve outstanding issues, give unfettered access, hand over documents, accept all weapons-related resolutions, and not interfere with the inspectors.
• He said the US would stay vigilant and ready to act, and would work with Congress on the Iraq Liberation Act to support a new government in Baghdad.
• Asked why the tone changed from the day before, he said three further Iraqi letters fixed the holes in the first one.
• He gave four reasons to expect compliance: unprecedented consensus, a credible threat of force, clear commitments, and continued readiness to act.
• Cohen, Berger and Shelton said a strike order was given and rescinded at the last moment, that no Security Council approval was needed to act, and that troop morale was high.

Chapters

1. 0:17Iraq agrees to cooperate with weapons inspectors
2. 2:08Five obligations Iraq must meet
3. 3:28International consensus and long-term policy on Iraq
4. 6:30Why the US held off the attack
5. 9:40Four reasons to expect compliance
6. 13:57Berger on testing Iraq and Security Council approval
7. 17:24Cohen on the strike order and force levels
8. 24:21Trust, damage to inspections and troop readiness

Full transcript

0:17Good morning. Last night, Iraq agreed to meet the demands of the international community to cooperate fully with the United Nations weapons inspectors. Iraq committed to unconditional compliance. It rescinded its decisions of August and October to end cooperation with the inspectors. It withdrew its objectionable conditions.

0:54In short, Iraq accepted its obligation to permit all activities of the weapons inspectors, UNSCOM, and the IAEA to resume in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. The United States, together with Great Britain, and with the support of our friends and allies around the world, was poised to act militarily if Iraq had not reversed course. Our willingness to strike, together with the overwhelming weight of world opinion, produced the outcome we preferred, Saddam Hussein reversing course, letting the inspectors go back to work without restrictions or conditions.

1:36As I have said since this crisis began, the return of the inspectors, if they can operate in an unfettered way, is the best outcome because they have been and they remain the most effective tool to uncover, destroy, and prevent Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. Now, let me be clear, Iraq has backed down, but that is not enough.

2:08Now Iraq must live up to its obligations. Iraq has committed to unconditionally resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. What does that mean? First, Iraq must resolve all outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM and the IAEA. Second, it must give inspectors unfettered access to inspect and to monitor all sites they choose, with no restrictions or qualifications, consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding, Iraq itself signed with Secretary General Lanham in February.

2:48Third, it must turn over all relevant documents. Fourth, it must accept all weapons of mass destruction-related resolutions. Fifth, it must not interfere with the independence or the professional expertise of the weapons inspectors. Last night, again, I confirmed with the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, that he shares these understandings of Iraq's obligations. In bringing on this crisis, Iraq isolated itself from world opinion and opinion in the region more than at any time since the Gulf War.

3:28The United Nations Security Council voted 15-0 to demand that Saddam Hussein reverse course. Eight Arab nations – Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, five other Gulf states – warned Saddam that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the consequences of defying the United Nations. The world spoke with one voice. Iraq must accept once and for all that the only path forward is complete compliance with its obligations to the world.

4:00Until we see complete compliance, we will remain vigilant, we will keep up the pressure, we will be ready to act. This crisis also demonstrates, unfortunately, once again, that Saddam Hussein remains an impediment to the well-being of his people and a threat to the peace of his region and the security of the world. Well, we will continue to contain the threat that he poses by working for the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability under UNSCOM, enforcing the sanctions in the no-fly zone, responding firmly to any Iraqi provocations.

4:44However, over the long term, the best way to address that threat is through a government in Baghdad, a new government that is committed to represent and respect its people, not repress them, that is committed to peace in the region. Over the past year, we have deepened our engagement with the forces of change in Iraq, reconciling the two largest Kurdish opposition groups, beginning broadcasts of a radio-free Iraq throughout the country.

5:16We will intensify that effort, working with Congress to implement the Iraq Liberation Act, which was recently passed, strengthening our political support to make sure the opposition, or to do what we can to make the opposition, a more effective voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Let me say again, what we want and what we will work for is a government in Iraq that represents and respects its people, them, not represses them, and one committed to live in peace with its neighbors.

5:52In the century we are leaving, America has often made the difference between tyranny and freedom, between chaos and community, between fear and hope. In this case, as so often in the past, the reason America can make this difference is the patriotism and professionalism of our military. Once again, its strength, its readiness, its capacity is advancing America's interest in the cause of world peace.

6:30We must remain vigilant, strong, and ready, here and wherever our interests and values are at stake. Thanks to our military, we will be able to do so. Mr. President, what you just said today sounds a lot less tough, sir, than what your national security adviser said yesterday. He called it what Iraq said unconditionally unacceptable, and he said it had more holes than Swiss cheese. That's right. And look what they did after we said that. That's right. Look what's happened since they said that. We decided to delay the attack when we were informed that Iraq was going to offer us a statement, the world, committing to complete compliance. And you will recall, when that statement came in, there were members of the international community and members of the Security Council who said that they thought that the statement was sufficient to avoid a military conflict and to get UNSCOM

7:37back in. We did not agree and the British did not agree. Mr. Berger and Prime Minister Blair both went out and made statements to that effect. After that occurred, we received three subsequent letters from the government of Iraq going to the president of the Security Council, dealing with the three big holes we saw in the original Iraqi letter.

8:09First of all, it became clear, and they made it clear, that the attachment to the letter was in no way a condition of their compliance, that their compliance was not conditional. Secondly, they explicitly revoked the decisions they made in August and October to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM. And thirdly, they made it clear that they would not just let the inspectors back in to wander around in a very large country but that their cooperation with them would be unconditional and complete. Those were the things which occurred after Mr. Berger spoke and after Prime Minister Blair spoke. Those were the things which have caused us to conclude.

9:04That with world opinion unanimous and with the ability to actually, the prospect at least, of getting this inspection system going until we can complete the work that we have been working on now since the end of the Gulf War, it was those three things that made us believe we should go forward. That is the difference between where we are now and where we were yesterday when the United States and Great Britain made its statements. Why is there any reason to believe that Iraq will comply this time when it has failed to do so repeatedly in the past?

9:40Well, I think there are four things that I would say about it. With the beginning, that no one can be sure. We're not, this is not a question of faith, this is a question of action. Let me remind you, the most important sentence in the statement I just read you was, Iraq has backed down, but that's not enough. Now Iraq must live up to its obligations. Now, let me just point out four things. Number one, we have an unprecedented consensus here.

10:15I do not believe that anyone can doubt that there was an unprecedented consensus. Condemning what Saddam Hussein had done in not cooperating with UNSCOM. Number two, we had a very credible threat of overwhelming force, which was imminent had we not received word that Iraq was prepared to make the commitments we had been asking for.

10:50Number three, the set of commitments we received in the end after making our position clear yesterday and refusing to negotiate or water down our position is clear and unambiguous. And number four, we remain ready to act. So we don't have to rely on our feelings here or whether we believe anything.

11:21The question is, have we made the proper judgment to suspend any military action in order to give Iraq a chance to fulfill its commitments, even though it has failed to do so so many times in the past? These four things are what you have to keep in mind. I believe, I believe, let me just say this. I believe we have made the right decision for a very specific reason. And I think it's very important that we keep hammering this home. If we take military action, we can significantly degrade the capability of Saddam Hussein to develop weapons of mass destruction and to deliver them. But that would also mark the end of UNSCOM.

12:10So we would delay it, but we would then have no oversight, no insight, no involvement in what is going on within Iraq. If we can keep UNSCOM in there working and one more time give him a chance to become honorably reconciled by simply observing United Nations resolutions, we see that results can be obtained. look what has happened this year we had the VX testing and this summer I can't remember exactly when it was that I'm sure that when my team comes up here to answer the questions I can we uncovered a very important document giving us giving the world community information about the quantity and nature of weapons stocks that had not been available before.

13:00So I have to tell you, you have to understand where I'm coming from here. I really believe that if you have a professional, unscom, free and unfettered, able to do its job, it can do what it is supposed to do in Iraq. And given the fact that I believe that over the next 10 to 20 years, this whole issue of chemical and biological weaponry will be one of the major threats facing the world having the experience the record and the success if we can do it of having a united nations inspection regime in iraq can have grave positive implications for the future profound positive implications if it works and grave implications in a negative way if it doesn't So I believe we made the right decision, and I believe that the factors that I cited to you make it the right decision.

13:57Now, what I'd like to do now, you're asking, you naturally enough want to get into a lot of the specific questions here that I believe that Secretary Cohen. And General Shelton and Mr. Berger can do a good job of answering, and none of us have had a great deal of sleep, but I think it would be appropriate for me to let them answer the rest of the questions. Thank you. Is this the question over, Mr. President? Is this the question over? How do you lower this damn thing?

14:28Sandy. Yes. What do you say for criticism that Southampton may be jerking the United States around? ...before, since the Gulf War, we were able to build a consensus against Saddam Hussein. We said from the beginning that our preferred outcome was to get the UNSCOM inspectors back in. Saddam Hussein yesterday, finally, last night, made an unequivocal, clear statement that the UNSCOM inspectors could come back in unconditionally.

15:02We will test that. If it works, what the President said will play itself out. If it doesn't work, if they do not comply, we are prepared to act as the President indicated. Will you strike without warning? Because that was the same thing you said last time in February, testing it and then a month or two later they again interrupt things. And then there's warnings again. Will you again go back to the Security Council if in a month or so they deny access?

15:33We don't believe we have any obligation to go back to the Security Council. I would like to ask, you don't have any obligation? We do not believe we need any Security Council authority, particularly under these circumstances. We don't believe we needed it last night or yesterday, and we certainly don't believe we need it under circumstances chances if, in the face of this, Saddam Hussein does not fulfill the clear obligations that he made last night. Let me add one thing and let the Secretary and the General answer something.

16:06When I came out here last night, we had a four-page letter from Saddam Hussein that a pack of Iraqi lawyers couldn't have figured out. It was convoluted, it was conditional, it was ungrammatic, and it was perfectly un-, thoroughly unclear. What happened after Prime Minister Blair and the United States Government said we refused to accept that, notwithstanding the fact that many were prepared to accept that, is that we received actually two additional letters, the President said three, but two, very clear, very understandable, saying unconditional.

16:52Compliance, rescission of the decisions of August and October. Clear, simple statements. Now, we will test that. We will see whether or not the words, the actions follow the words. I think that we had an obligation to test that before we launched a military attack. If, in fact, the actions do not meet the words, obviously, we will have to consider other actions.

17:24A cover for the U.S. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you a question, sir? Actually, a three-part question, if I may. First of all, would you clarify, for the record, was a cruise missile strike ordered by the Commander-in-Chief yesterday? Second, did this country or any other inform Saddam Hussein that such an airstrike was imminent? And thirdly, will the deployed buildup that you ordered deployed continue in the Persian Gulf? Well, as the President indicated, we were prepared to act.

17:55The President did issue an order. And as we know, that order was rescinded based upon the fact that the Iraqis indicated they were about to capitulate, and that is precisely what they have done. They ran it up to the end. They saw that two things. They saw, number one, that we were serious. This was not an empty threat. At number two, we were substantial in numbers and capability. As a result of that demonstration of force and also the diplomatic initiatives that had been taken, namely all of the support that we had throughout the Gulf and the Security Council, they finally came to the conclusion it was the wise and prudent thing for them to do to capitulate to the demands of the United States.

18:47SECONDLY, AS WE'VE INDICATED, WE HAVE A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN PLACE WHICH CAN BE AUGMENTED WITH A VERY SHORT TIME FRAME, AND WE'VE INDICATING BY OUR ACTIONS THAT WE CAN AUGMENT THAT VERY QUICKLY. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE FORCES FLOWING INTO THE REGION. WE WILL MAKE A JUDGMENT IN TERMS OF WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD HAVE ENOUGH ON HAND AND CAN BE AGAIN INCREASED ON A MOMENT'S NOTICE IF WE HAVE TO DO SO. Mr. Secretary, what is the time frame you're saying between the rescinding and the order?

19:20How much time does Saddam have before the military strike? I won't go into any operational details other than saying it was close, and I would say very close. Could you say at least yes or no? It was close. Secretary Cohen, by President Clinton's language, he used some very strong words. Was he calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein? And if so, what can the United States or the world community do to facilitate that? He was not calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussain. And what he was saying is that we are prepared and will work with opposition forces or groups to try to bring about at some future time in a more democratic type of regime that's more responsive to its people and not to engage in the harsh and brutal repression of them.

20:04But that's something in a long-term goal, and we have taken steps in consultation with Congress to put into place the Iraqi free radio. And we will continue to take other measures that will hopefully build a more significant opposition in the future. Is the U.S. subsidizing opposition groups? MR. No, you know, subsidization. Congress has indicated it would like very much for us to pursue this program.

20:35We will work with Congress and work with other groups on a very prudent, systematic step-by-step basis so we're not going to take any Any premature actions, but rather build long-term support, hopefully, for a different type of regime. Mr. Secretary, will you be keeping the same strength of force in the Gulf for several months in order to act immediately? Because the last time in February you drew down and now it takes a while to get those forces back. Will it truly be without warning next time?

21:05As we've indicated, we don't need very much time. We have a significant force on hand. And we had the forces on hand that could have taken action on a moment's notice. We also indicated that in order to give the President more flexibility for different military options, we augmented that force. We can flow the forces in and flow them back, but maintain a steady force there that is more than adequate to deal with Saddam Hussein. Well, is there a follow-up change of the fact that you're now saying no warning?

21:35Is this a change of policy, a strengthening of those words? The President, we've indicated in the past that we have more than adequate forces on hand to take and exercise a military option at any time. That still will remain the case. Secretary, bringing the forces in and out and back and forth, does that create or are you concerned that it creates a credibility problem? For the administration, when there are constant threats of military strikes that never materialize? Not at all. There's no credibility problem. As a matter of fact, we had the total support of our Gulf friends.

22:06We have all that is necessary for us to carry out a military operation. They understand that we can increase those forces or decrease those forces, depending upon the nature of the threat. And we'll continue to do so. Let me just add one thing. I don't think there was any, in terms of credibility, I don't think there was any credibility gap with Saddam Hussein last night. He understood that we were prepared to use force, and that is why he backed down. But, Sandy, don't you think in the Arab world they're going to look at it and say, okay, Saddam won again?

22:38No, I don't believe that's true, and I don't believe that's what they're saying. I believe, listen, we have said from the beginning, and they've said from the beginning, that they, the best outcome here is for him to back down, let the UNSCOM inspectors in and do their work he's back down let's see if he lets the UNSCOM inspectors in let's see if they can do their work we we we have to be able to take yes for an answer when we say that if he It is a better outcome here to test that and see whether UNSCOM can get back in and do its work.

23:17Let me add one thing that was Sandy just saying. We just had a Gulf Council resolution. The GCC just passed a resolution last week saying we want Saddam to reverse his decision. If he doesn't reverse his decision, then he must bear the full consequences of his actions. Very direct language on their part saying reverse Saddam. Saddam has now reversed his course of action. What would have been the human cost in terms of an airstrike of continuous casualties?

23:49Well, it has always been our policy to try to minimize damage and injury to innocent people. We talk about collateral damage on all occasions whenever we take military action. That is a concern that we take into account, and all of our planning took that into account. Mr. Secretary, even the fact that you have had Saddam back down when the jets apparently were in the air and all the missiles were targeted, it's very easy to understand why he might be willing to back down with that kind of pressure. But the question that keeps coming back, I'm sure, for the American people is...

24:21How can you be sure that he's going to be good to his word when he's never been good to his word in the past? Why do you believe that? Well, I think the President addressed this issue. Number one, there is as broad an international consensus about Saddam Hussein as there's ever been. There's never been this kind of international consensus that he has to abide by these obligations. He was completely isolated. There was not a country, not France, not Russia, not China, not anyone supporting him. And then when he saw that the Gulf states also, along with Egypt and Syria, passed that resolution, I think that he understood he no longer has any friends that he can seek to divide either the Council or the Allies.

25:00And so I think that in combination with our strength on hand and with the commitment that the President has laid out, that he has the following obligations, and it's very clear what the President said. He not only has to allow the inspectors back in to conduct their inspections, He now has to agree, and through Kofi Annan, who has accepted this, he must have an affirmative duty to supply information that he has withheld in the past. Those would be the tests that we're looking for, and if we don't see it in his actions, then there are other consequences that flow from it. How much damage has been done to General Sheldon, given the interruption?

25:33How much damage has been done to the inspectors? How much information has been lost and the ability of Saddam Hussein to move his weapons around? Well, I think a more definitive answer has to come from UNSCOM. There has been monitoring up until the last week or so, so that all the sites that were under monitoring supervision have been, cameras have been working up until UNSCOM withdrew earlier this week. But clearly, with UNSCOM out, he could reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction in a matter of months, not years.

26:10So we now have, we will now test the proposition of whether or not he'll let Unscum back in to do their job and avoid that potential of reconstitution. If he does not, as the President has indicated very clearly, we are prepared to act. Thank you. Presidential site. Joe, may we send himself in a question, sir? Joe. Just one. Thank you. General, with all the stand-downs and alerts, what is the morale of the troops like in this situation and their readiness?

26:41Well, first of all, let me say how proud I am of the trained and ready force that we have maintained in the Persian Gulf, in particular the ones that are deployed there right now, as well as the crisis response force that Secretary Cohen referred to and that we're in the process of deploying at this time. The morale of the troops that are involved in this operation, which of course are forward deployed, our first to fight, is very high. They're professionals. They understand their business. But those of us in uniform always understand the price of war or what, that war is a very dirty business. And so anytime that we can be a part of bringing back, bringing about a peaceful solution, we're always happy for that. Thanks.

Source and licence

Recording: File:President Clinton on the Situation in Iraq (1998).webm by clintonlibrary42 (Taken on 15 November 1998), via Wikimedia Commons. Licence: Public domain.

The transcript is machine speech-to-text by the TidyTools Audio & video transcriber; the summary, key points and chapters were written by Claude from that transcript. Both may contain errors: check the recording before quoting it.